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CHANGING THE RULES OF THE (INTERNATIONAL) 
GAME: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW IS TURNING 
NATIONAL COURTS INTO INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ACTORS 
Osnat Grady Schwartz † 
Abstract: Courts are known to be political actors.  National courts play the 
political game in the national domain.  International courts play it in the international 
sphere.  This article studies the transformation of national courts into international 
political actors (IPAs), and the part international law plays in so making them.  The 
article identifies, categorizes, and demonstrates the influence of national courts and 
judges on international relations (IR), separating the influence into two main categories:  
direct and indirect.  Direct influence, is the effect of a national court taking a position on 
international issues in concrete situations with immediate IR implications.  Indirect 
influence is the effect of a national court supporting trends that transform international 
politics (specifically legalization and judicialization of IR) through national courts and 
judges’ contribution to the empowerment of international law.  This process progresses as 
national courts increase their engagement with international law, making national courts 
stronger and more significant actors in international politics. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past two decades it became generally accepted that courts are 
political actors.  National courts play the political game in their national 
domain;1 international courts play it in the international sphere.2  However, 
                                                      
† PhD, lecturer at the Law Faculty, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, visiting scholar at UC 
Berkeley.  I wish to thank Professor Stefano Guzzini for his enlightening remarks on the concept of 
international actors.  I am also grateful to Dr. Galia Press-Barnathan and Dr. Piki Ish-Shalom for their 
valuable notes on a former draft of this article.  The contents of this article are solely the responsibility of 
the author. 
1 See THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995); 
Ran Hirschl, The New Constitution and the Judicialization of Politics Worldwide, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
721, 723-724 (2006); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 
(2002); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 129-37 
(2000); Itzhak Galnoor, The Judicialization of the Public Sphere in Israel, 37 ISR. L. REV. 500 (2003-
2004); Russell A. Miller, Lords of Democracy: The Judicialization of “Pure Politics” in the United States 
and Germany, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 587 (2004); Richard H. Pildes, Forward: The Constitutionalization 
of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2005).   
2 See generally KAREN ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS 
(2010) [hereinafter ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT]; KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014) [hereinafter ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN]; The International Rule of 
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the idea of national courts and judges being international political actors 
(“IPAs”), and the part played by international law (“IL”) in making them so, 
is still under-developed.  This article contributes to this notion by analyzing 
the ways in which national courts and judges act as IPAs, and how their 
engagement with international law supports this development.  
Recalling some foundational concepts in international relations 
(“IR”), an international actor is “an individual, group, state, or organization 
that plays a major role in world politics.”3  International actors shape and 
influence “the trends that are transforming world politics” and “take position 
on international issues.”4  This definition applies to national courts and 
judges, and reflects their increasing international political power, i.e., their 
increasing ability to influence international relations and the behavior of 
foreign states.  The international influence of national courts and judges is 
both direct and indirect.  It is direct when national courts and judges adopt 
positions on international issues in concrete situations with immediate IR 
implications, normally through engagement with rules and institutions of 
international law.  It is indirect when decisions of courts affect trends that 
transform international politics (specifically, the legalization and 
judicialization of IR) through mutually-empowering engagements with 
international law in all cases that favorably apply it. 
Two cross-border trends have enabled the transformation of national 
courts and judges into IPAs.  The first is the legalization of international 
relations, generally meaning the subordination of increasing numbers of 
subjects (issues and persons alike) to legal rules and standards embodied in 
international customs, conventions, norms, and “soft law.”5  Today, rules of 
international law govern almost every aspect of state behavior:  states are 
generally expected to abide by the (international) “rule of law,” and they 
share “Legalish” as a common language for international relations.  The 
second “enabling” trend is the judicialization of national politics, also known 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Law: Coordination and Collaboration in Global Justice, BRANDEIS INST. FOR INT’L JUDGES (2012), 
http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/BIIJ2012.pdf. 
3 CHARLES W. KEGLEY & SHANNON L. BLANTON, WORLD POLITICS: TREND AND TRANSFORMATION 
11 (Wadsworth 12th ed., 2009). 
4  Id. at 11, 13. 
5 This definition of legalization is different to the one offered by several scholars, who include in 
this term an institutional aspect as well.  Cf. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54(3) 
INT'L ORG. 401, 401-403 (2000).  
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as the “expansion of judicial power.”6  This trend is mostly found in Western 
democracies, and is often treated as “judicial activism.”7 
The legalization of international relations is a precondition for 
transforming national courts into IPAs in two ways.  First, as an axiom, legal 
professionals can act in a given arena only if applicable legal rules governs 
that arena.  In this respect, legalization of the international sphere transforms 
what used to be a strictly political arena into fertile soil for legal and judicial 
involvement.  Second, legalization of the international sphere, a normative 
process, is not backed with sufficient institutional guarantees of state 
compliance.8   Therefore, it creates an opportunity for national judicial 
involvement in fulfilling legal rules created by states.9  
The judicialization of national politics is the second requirement for 
national courts and judges to act as IPAs.  Since compliance with 
international law often entails sovereignty and flexibility costs,10 courts can 
only exploit the empowering impact of international law in practice if they 
are strong enough to confront their governments, using external 
legitimization and support from international sources.  The judicialization of 
national politics fulfills this precondition.  It reflects the strengthening of 
national courts vis-à-vis the political branches of their own national realms, 
which increases the number of political issues that end up in court.  
Several scholars have discussed the ideal roles and actual functions of 
national courts and judges in the international sphere.  To date, they 
presented three main models.  The first is Scelle’s model of dédoublement 
fonctionnel (role splitting), where national courts should perform a similar 
role in the international sphere to international court tribunals,11 basically 
ascribing to them a legal role and input.  The second is Whytock’s model of 
national courts as “global governors,” which also concentrates on the courts’ 
                                                      
6  See generally THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 1. 
7  See id. 
8  On domestic courts “filling the missing link,” see ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 6 (2010).  See also Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: 
Some Concluding Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 919, 925 (1999) (Abi-Saab's rule of legal physics 
requires a balance between normative and institutional density.  The current gap between the two levels 
motivates, or at least allows, domestic courts and judges to enter the international scene and eventually 
function as IPAs.). 
9 See NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 8. 
10  See Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54(3) INT'L ORG. 
661, 662-65 (2000). 
11 See LEO GROSS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 378, § 1 (1984); Antonio 
Cassese, Remarks on Scelle's Theory of "Role Splitting" (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law, 1 
EUR. J. INT'L L. 210, 218-19, 229 (1990). 
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legal functions (most of which involve employing private international law), 
rather than their political participation.12  The third model is Slaughter’s 
construction of national courts and judges as autonomous political actors, 
who act beyond the “unitary state” and become members of “cross-border 
networks” with their counterparts around the world.13  
Slaughter’s model examines the political input of national courts.14  
However, she primarily examines national courts’ horizontal and vertical 
interactions with fellow courts and judges (national and international).15  
Conversely, the IPAs model advanced in this article concentrates on the 
diagonal dimension of national courts’ influence on the behavior of foreign 
governments, and on foreign governments’ relations with the judges’ own 
state.  This diagonal dimension is therefore at the heart of this article.  
The diagonal dimension of national courts’ influence on IR manifests 
in the two ways mentioned previously:  a direct influence and an indirect 
influence on foreign governments’ behavior and their relations with the 
judges’ states.  With regard to the first kind of influence, national judges 
confront their governments and foreign governments involved in the 
proceedings in cases of extradition, immunities of states and officials, 
consular notification, and universal jurisdiction.16  For example, judges who 
initiated universal jurisdiction proceedings against foreign officials have 
more than once created a diplomatic crisis between their states and the 
nation states of the accused.17  As a result, foreign governments acted both 
internationally and domestically, canceling existing proceedings and using 
legal and political actions to prevent new ones.  An indirect influence on 
foreign and judges’ own governments occurs when national courts 
contribute to trends that dictate state behavior in the international sphere: 
legalization and judicialization of international politics.18 
                                                      
12 See Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67 
(2009). 
13 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 37 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996); ANNE-MARIE 
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12-15 (2004).  
14  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 12-15; Slaughter, supra note 13, at 62.  
15  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 12-15; Slaughter, supra note 13, at 62; Walter Mattli & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett, 49(1) INT'L ORG. 183, 184 
(1995) (focusing on the European experience, in which judges talk “above and below” the governments). 
16 See infra Part IV.A. 
17 See infra Part IV.A. 
18 See infra Part V.B. 
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Both trends have been transforming the rules of the international game 
from mostly political and diplomatic ones to more legally structured and 
subject to judicial scrutiny.  They obligate states to adopt the legal discourse 
and calculate their moves in the shadow of national and international judicial 
intervention.19  National courts contribute to these trends through positive 
engagement with IL that empowers the latter (and themselves) to make IL 
more relevant and consequential to governments’ formal and informal 
decisions. 
This article continues as follows:  Part II is an introductory chapter 
that delineates the scope and context of discussion.  It offers a 
methodological typology of categories of cases, judicial motivations, and 
consequential influences on IR.  These factors help to contextualize the 
analysis offered of IPAs practices.  Part III distinguishes in further detail 
between the IPAs model on one hand, and Scelle’s, Whytock’s, and 
Slaughter’s models on the other hand, in order to highlight this article’s 
contribution to existing IL-IR scholarship.  Part IV and Part V explain and 
demonstrate the ways in which national courts and judges perform as IPAs 
through engaging with international law.  Part IV demonstrates national 
courts’ and judges’ direct influence on IR in specific contexts and situations 
that intrinsically involve aspects of IR.  Part V contemplates their indirect 
influence on IR through applying international law in a variety of cases, 
especially ones that are essentially domestic.  
II. DEFINING THE SCOPE AND CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION 
In order to define the scope and context of the discussion surrounding 
the role of national courts as IPAs, it is important to identify the nature of 
their influence on international relations, explore types of cases, understand 
their causes and motivations, and note the difference between “strong” and 
“weak” IPAs. 
A. Identifying the Nature of Influence on International Relations 
The organizing idea behind categorizing national courts and judges as 
IPAs is the nature of their influence on international relations.  National 
courts’ influence on IR can be direct or indirect.  It can also be focalized or 
                                                      
19 See Yuval Shany, Negotiating in the Shadow of the Judicial Process: Domestic and International 
Perspectives, 1 NEKUDAT MIFGASH 46 (2003) (Isr.). 
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spread, general or particular.  Various combinations of the following 
attributes are possible:  
1. Direct influence on international relations causes specific incidents 
with immediate foreign affairs implications between states.  Indirect 
influence affects states’ behavior through a mediating factor—international 
law—that sets the “rules of the game” of the continuously-legalizing IR. 
2. Focalized influence affects specific states, i.e., states that are 
involved in a concrete dispute or have a particular interest in one.  Spread 
influence affects (at least potentially) all states or large groups of states. 
3. General influence affects basic norms of international conduct 
(e.g., developing core norms and standards of human rights law).  Particular 
influence relates to an individual state’s obligations that do not constitute 
common rules of international law. 
Some cases exhibit all types of influences—direct and indirect, 
focalized and spread, and general and specific IR implications.  The nature 
of influence does not necessarily determine its strength;  direct influence on 
international relations may be mild and short-term, while the indirect 
influence of various judicial decisions may be stronger and longer-lasting 
because they have a cumulative impact.  More often than not, only hindsight, 
if anything, can identify and estimate the impact of each and every judicial 
decision, isolated from other significant decisions or influencing factors.  
The typology offered here, however, is intended to draw attention to the 
various ways and directions in which national courts and judges can 
potentially influence IR. 
B. Types of Cases 
National courts’ decisions may affect states’ international relations 
regardless of the application of international law.  To delimit the scope of 
discussion, we should distinguish between two types of cases: 
1. “Pure” IR-related cases: Cases that intrinsically involve IR 
considerations but do not include references to international law (e.g., 
rejecting or granting a petition to allow a demonstration in front of a foreign 
embassy in consideration of diplomatic relations with that foreign state).20  
                                                      
20 See, e.g., HCJ 496/85 Servetman v. the Police Chief of Tel-Aviv District 40(4) PD 550 [1986] 
(Isr.) (giving primacy to the international relations with Egypt over the freedom of public demonstration, 
especially as grave security concerns were also present).  See also HCJ 953/89 Meir Indor v. Teddi Kollek, 
Mayor of Jerusalem City 45(4) PD 683 [1991] (Isr.) (declaring that only when there is a high probability of 
grave risk to the state's international relations, administrative acts may infringe upon human rights; in this 
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There is no evidence of an increase in such cases, and, in any event, their 
number and impact seem too small to transform national courts into IPAs.  
Therefore, they do not concern the subject of this Article.  
  2. “Mixed” IR-IL cases: Cases in which IR implications are tied to 
judicial engagement with IL.  This category includes two sub-categories:  (a) 
cases that are essentially domestic and (b) cases that are intrinsically 
international.  An example of the first sub-category is judicial review of the 
constitutionality of a national law, in which the court refers to IL norms 
through doctrines of consistent interpretation and comparative law.21  The IR 
impact of such cases may be incidental and unintended, though by no means 
unimportant.  An example of the second sub-category is the application of 
universal jurisdiction to try foreign officials for crimes under international 
law. 22   Such cases have clear and immediate IR implications for the 
prosecuting state and the defendants’ nation-state.  
 
C. Causes and Motivations  
 
To a large extent, the transformation of national courts into IPAs is 
driven by exogenous changes—the growing density of international law,23 
its increasing relevance to inward-looking domestic affairs, 24  and the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
case, the relations with the U.S. versus the freedom of speech of an Israeli citizen who desecrated the U.S. 
flag).  It should not be surprising, that these cases are brought by Dotan as examples of judicial activism in 
Israel.  See Yoav Dotan, Judicial Activism in the HCJ, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: FOR AND AGAINST—THE 
PLACE OF THE HCJ IN ISRAELI SOCIETY 5, 48-49 (Ruth Gavison, Mordechai Kremnitzer, & Yoav Dotan 
eds., 2000).  For general scholarship on the issue, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/ 
JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992).  
21 See Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analysis of the 
Influence of International Human Rights Treaties Upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by 
Domestic Courts, 31(2) BROOK J. INT’L L. 341 (2006); Roy Bijon, An Empirical Survey of Foreign 
Jurisprudence and International Instruments in Charter Litigation, 99 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 99 
(2004); Kristen Walker, International Law as a Tool of Constitutional Interpretation, 28 MONASH U. L. 
REV. 85 (2002); Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of 
International Law: the Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocation of Foreign and International Law, 29 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 507 (2006); Michael Kirby, The Growing Rapprochement between International Law 
and National Law, in THE GROWING RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL 
LAW (Antony Anghie & Garry Sturgess eds., 1998); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human 
Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Human Rights, 20(4) OXFORD J.  LEGAL STUD. 499 
(2000). 
22 See Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the 
Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105(1) AM. J. INT. L 1, 41 (2011). 
23 See William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963, 967 
(2004). 
24 See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial 
Function of National Courts, 34 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 133, 138-142 (2011). 
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expansion of globalization.25  All of these changes bring more transnational 
activity to national courts.26  On the other hand, national courts can also 
choose to perform as IPAs even when not pushed into this position by the 
circumstances of specific cases.  Theoretically, we can distinguish between 
three types of judicial “motivations” to engage with international law, 
reflecting the spectrum of “internationalist inclination” judges may possess.  
The first “motivation” is essentially “passive” in that it is a result of 
exogenous constraints, and not of independent choice.  The second 
motivation is “active” because it favorably responds to the parties’ invitation 
to apply international law, which expresses judicial discretion and a choice 
to engage with international law when possible, but not unavoidable.  The 
third motivation is “proactive” in that it takes the initiative to employ 
international law and invoke it to advance the court’s or judge’s agenda. 
Motivations are hard to track, and their study can lead to wild 
interpretations if not conducted in a systematic method.  Inferring them from 
the language of judicial decisions may be tricky because judges can disguise 
motivations in a sophisticated way when necessary to protect their decision’s 
legitimacy.  In a different paper, this author suggested a methodology to 
empirically measure judges’ internationalist inclinations by examining the 
status that they gave to international law in cases where it was applied (from 
primary normative guidelines for the decision to the canon of interpretation 
from national law to comparative law).27  This, however, is not the focus of 
the current discussion, as this section does not attempt to answer how we can 
identify judicial motivations, but rather attempts to describe what 
motivations may exist.  The following typology should therefore be 
understood as an analytical exercise for studying the what, not the how.  
1. Passive/involuntary (i.e., externally-driven) motivation—acting as 
an IPA without independent personal motivation: Judges may act as IPAs 
due to reasons and circumstances beyond their control, such as changes in 
the adjudication setting (e.g., globalization with its increasing transnational 
litigation), and the types of cases presented before them.  In such cases, the 
fact that judges act as IPAs is an unavoidable consequence of the 
                                                      
25 See Whytock, supra note 12, at 74. 
26 Id. 
27 See generally Osnat Grady Schwartz, International Law in Domestic Judges' Decisions: The 
Relationship Between Broad Role-Perception and a Strong Internationalist Inclination, 34 T.A. U. L. REV. 
475 (2011). 
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circumstances, and occurs regardless of their personal tendencies and 
inclinations.  
2. Active-responsive motivation: Judges act as IPAs in a discretionary 
way by demonstrating their willingness to engage with international law 
when they can but are not obligated to do so.  In some cases, such practice is 
a positive response to the parties’ reference to international law.  Where the 
court can reject or ignore such a reference, or dismiss the case altogether—
and especially when the court has a history of doing so (e.g., in the context 
of national security and occupation)28—the court’s willingness to apply 
international law expresses an active choice.  A strong example of 
willingness is judicial cooperation with private initiatives to open 
investigations or issue arrest warrants against foreign officials for alleged 
universal crimes (as a number of UK judges did).29 
3. Proactive-initiative motivation: Judges can become IPAs 
proactively, by independently initiating the application of international law 
when such an application is either evitable or evolves from parties’ 
submissions.  The most extreme case is when national judges open criminal 
procedures against foreign officials of their own accord (in states granting 
judges such authority, e.g., Spain and Germany).30  A less extreme case is 
when judges voluntarily invoke international law to substantiate their 
decisions, which are not necessarily tied to international law.  Choice can 
take the shape of interpretive presumption (e.g., a presumption of 
consistency of national law with international law, or an IL-based 
presumption of administrative integrity of acts aimed at complying with 
international obligations) and comparative law.31  Such engagement with 
international law is self-motivated, and is a proactive step to becoming an 
IPA. 
D. A Comment on “Strong” and “Weak” IPAs 
To summarize, national courts’ influence on IR can be direct or 
indirect, focalized or spread, and general or particular.  This influence can 
                                                      
28 See, e.g., HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din-Volunteers Organization for Human Rights v. IDF Commander 
in the West Bank Tak-El 2011(4) 4101 [2011] (Isr.) (President Beinisch establishing that the case could be 
dismissed based on barrier doctrines, but nevertheless thinking it right to examine the case merits in light of 
art. 55 of the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 187 CTS 227 (1907)). 
29 See infra Part IV.D. 
30 See infra Part IV.D.   
31 See infra Part V.A. 
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materialize through domestic cases and intrinsically IR-related cases.  The 
influence can be self-motivated by judges or circumstantially imposed on 
them.  Different cases can present different combinations of these features.  
For instance, consider the following different options:  First, a random 
distribution of cases (where courts do not sit en banc) may bring more IR-
related cases to “passive” judges who—regardless of their will or 
intentions—may have a more direct and concrete impact on their state’s 
international relations than their “active” or even “proactive” colleagues.  
Second, intrinsically IR-related cases brought before “active” judges who 
make internationally-minded decisions aimed to directly influence state 
behavior on concrete matters.  Third, domestic cases handled by “passive” 
judges, who opt to disregard international law, and write their decisions only 
in terms of their domestic law, even when their domestic law expresses or 
incorporates international law norms (e.g., decisions regarding 
“consubstantial norms”).32  Such a situation deprives international law of 
opportunities to develop and prevents additional judicial influence on 
international relations.  
National courts and judges perform as IPAs with varying levels of 
vigor, on a scale from “weak” to “strong.”  Theoretically, “passively 
motivated” judges can have a stronger IR impact than their 
“actively/proactively motivated” counterparts, if only because of the nature 
of the cases brought before them.  However, “actively” and “proactively” 
motivated judges are more likely to be “stronger” IPAs, since their IR 
impact is less dependent on exogenous constraints and chance, and more on 
their own initiative.  The stronger the judge’s “internationalist inclination,” 
the more likely she is to engage with international law voluntarily, thereby 
increasing her influence on the international scene, and becoming a “strong” 
IPA. 
III. EXISTING MODELS: SCELLE, WHYTOCK, AND SLAUGHTER 
A. Scelle’s Model 
IPAs differ substantially from international legal actors—a function 
that Scelle’s theory of dédoublement fonctionnel (role splitting) expects 
                                                      
32 Consubstantial norms are lengthily discussed by Antonios Tzanakopoulos who generally explains 
them as "domestic rules that are in substance reflective of an existing international rule." See 
Tzanakopoulos, supra note 24, at 143. 
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national courts to fulfill. 33   Scelle writes from a clear internationalist 
perspective, and is mainly concerned with what national courts can do for 
international law (i.e., not how they can utilize it for their purposes).34  
According to Scelle’s theory, national authorities bear double 
responsibility—national and international.35  This is true of all branches of 
government, including the judiciary that, when implementing international 
law, steps into the shoes of the weak or sometimes even absent international 
courts.36  According to Shany, there are an increasing number of instances in 
which national courts serve as international actors, performing a role akin to 
what international courts perform.37 
Article 17 of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Statute,38 
which embodies the complementarity principle, provides a good example of 
functional equivalence between national and international courts, and is 
compatible with Scelle’s model.  This principle acknowledges the primary 
role of national judicial systems in assuring accountability for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide.  It does so by stipulating that when a 
state has conducted a genuine investigation or prosecution of these crimes, 
the case should be determined inadmissible to the ICC.39  Therefore, when 
trying the individuals accused of such international crimes, national courts 
function, to some extent, as international judiciaries that should be replaced 
by the ICC only if they are unwilling or unable to perform this duty. 
Scelle’s approach envisions courts in their traditional sense—i.e., 
institutions whose role is confined to the realm of law (in this case, 
international law).  It does not consider their judicial decisions to be political 
acts, as it does not consider the acts of international courts to be political per 
                                                      
33 See GROSS, supra note 11; Cassese, supra note 11.  
34 See generally GROSS, supra note 11; Cassese, supra note 11. 
35 See GROSS, supra note 11. 
36 See Cassese, supra note 11, at 213.  This theory has been questioned by some scholars.  For a 
summary of the primary objections, see Yuval Shany, National Courts as International Actors: 
Jurisdictional Implications, in FEDERALISM 1, 2 nn.51-59 (2009).  
37 See Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analysis of the 
Influence of International Human Rights Treaties upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by 
Domestic Courts, 31(2) BROOK J. INT’L L. 341 (2006); see also Janet Koven Levit, A Tale of International 
Law in the Heartland: Torres and the Role of State Courts in Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TULSA 
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 163 (2004); Burke-White, supra note 23; Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, 
National Courts, Domestic Democracy and the Evolution of National Law, 20(1) EUR. J. INT'L L. 59 (2009). 
38 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 90. 
39 Id. at art. 17(1)(a)-(b). 
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se (or consider international law to have strong political elements).40  Hence, 
Scelle’s theory can substantiate an argument about the legal-professional 
status and performance of national courts in the international realm, but not 
about their political influence.  This is one aspect in which our theories 
differ.  Another is that Scelle’s theory is mostly prescriptive, while the 
theory advanced in this article is generally descriptive-evaluative—whereas 
Scelle wishes to draw a desired model, this article theorizes and models 
observations on an existing reality. 
B.  Whytock’s Model 
According to Whytock, increased transnational activity has created a 
need for global governance, and national courts fulfill some functions within 
this governance system.41  He adopts Keohane’s definition of “governance” 
as “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and 
restrain . . . collective activit[y].”42  Global governance is the process of 
guiding and restraining transnational activity.43  
To Whytock, national courts take part in global governance by 
performing two governance functions:  jurisdictional and substantive.44  On 
the jurisdictional level, national courts determine “who governs” when more 
than one state potentially has the authority to govern the transnational 
activity.  National courts generally do so by applying the rules and doctrines 
of private international law and choice of law.45  On the substantive level, 
they answer “who gets what?” by determining the rights and duties of 
transnational actors based on domestic, foreign, and international law.46 
Whytock's analysis resembles that of Scelle’s in many respects.  In 
fact, on several points, Scelle’s prescriptive approach seems to have 
                                                      
40 For an opposite analysis of international courts as political entities, see ALTER, THE EUROPEAN 
COURT, supra note 2; ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN, supra note 2.  
41 See Whytock, supra note 12, at 74. 
42 Id. at 71 n.11 (quoting ROBERT O. KEOHANE, POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY 
GLOBALIZED WORLD 202, 245-46 (2002)). 
43 See Whytock, supra note 12, at 71 n.11.  
44  See id. at 75. 
45  See id. at 75-83.  Whytock's example of the use of “act of state” doctrine to allocate adjudicative 
authority acknowledges the place of public international law in the jurisdictional function of domestic 
courts as global governors.  But even here, Whytock clarifies that this doctrine has also been characterized 
as a separation of powers doctrine and a choice of law doctrine.  See id. at 79 n.40 (referring to GARY B. 
BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 751-55 (4th 
ed. 2007)). 
46 See Whytock, supra note 12, at 71-72, 92-94.  
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materialized in Whytock’s descriptive-evaluative picture of today’s 
globalized world. Scelle’s idealized “suprastate” 47  shares many 
characteristics with Whytock’s descriptions of transnational activity where 
private actors are becoming more prominent.48  Both writers ascribe national 
and international/supranational roles to national courts.49  Both writers also 
view public international law and private international law as interwoven 
legal branches. 50  Nonetheless, while Scelle (like this author) focuses more 
on public international law, 51  Whytock adopts a more comprehensive 
concept of “transnational law,”52 in which public international law is just 
one of many interlinked legal regimes that govern transnational activity 
(including various fields of national private law, such as torts, contracts, and 
property), and are managed via the rules of private international law.53  
Clearly, in Whytock’s model, public international law is not central to the 
function of national courts as global governors.54 
                                                      
47 As distinct from “interstate.” See Cassese, supra note 11, at 213-14, 225, 231. 
48 As opposed to a scene solely dominated by sovereign nations.   See, e.g., Whytock, supra note 12, 
at 92, 94-95.  It is true that Scelle's desired “ecumenical community”—a society of peoples and 
individuals—is far from reaching its desired ambition, which is a “progressive universal federalism.”  See 
Cassese, supra note 11, at 216-17.  Still, the growing centrality of private actors in the transnational scene 
challenges state sovereignty—a desired goal in its own right in Scelle's view.  See id. at 216.   
49 Scelle sees them as having “dédoublement fonctionnel”—national and international alike.  See 
GROSS, supra note 11.  Whytock sees them as “global governors” additional to their traditional domestic 
functions.  See Whytock, supra note 12, at 71.  
50 See GROSS, supra note 11, at 211-12; Whytock, supra note 12, at 115. 
51 On Scelle's observations, see Cassese, supra note 11, at 211-12. 
52 See, e.g., Whytock, supra note 12, at 75 nn.21, 94.  Whytock adopts Philip Jessup's concept of 
transnational law as “‘the body of law that regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers,’ a 
concept meant to embody both public and private international law.”  Id. at 115 (quoting PHILIP C. JESSUP, 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956)).  He agrees with Jessup's objection to the “distinction between national 
and international law as a basis for legal classification” to also include in his definition “domestic legal 
rules that apply to transnational activity.”  Whytock, supra note 12, at 115-16. 
53 Private international law seems the most dominant system in Whytock's theory; its centrality is 
also evident in his preliminary attempt at presenting a systemic analysis of the global governance functions 
of domestic courts.  See Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance: The Politics of 
Private International Law (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with the 
author), available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/452. 
54 While international judicial institutions are generally restricted to the application of public 
international law, and usually specific branches of it (with the exception of the ICJ), national courts are 
unlimited in this respect and can adjudicate any legal conflict and under some circumstances can also apply 
any system of laws based on the rules of private international law.  Furthermore, international courts and 
tribunals usually adjudicate conflicts between states (with the exception of courts such as the ECHR and 
the ACHR), while national courts—which generally do not have such an authority—adjudicate cases 
between individuals, private and public institutions, transnational corporations etc., and between any of the 
former and states, subject to the doctrine of state immunity.  See U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004) (The 
convention has not yet entered into force). 
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It stands to reason that the differences between Scelle’s and 
Whytock’s views of national courts simply emanate from significant world 
developments between 1930 (Scelle) and today (Whytock).  Still, much like 
Scelle’s approach, and contrary to this article’s, Whytock’s functional 
approach envisions courts as legal-professional bodies and does not ascribe 
international political characteristics to them.  Whytock also focuses on 
transnational activity, whereas this article focuses on inter-state relations.55  
C. Slaughter’s Model 
As previously argued, national courts transcend the boundaries of 
their traditional role as state organs by becoming IPAs, and function in some 
respects as independent actors in the international arena.  In this context, my 
argument corresponds with Slaughter’s theory on the “disaggregated 
state,”56 and extends her idea of national courts as autonomous foreign 
policy actors.”57  According to Slaughter, actors such as regulators, judges, 
and legislators, who were traditionally considered integral organs of the 
“unitary state,” are increasingly joining border-crossing networks with their 
counterparts around the world.58  Slaughter considers the practice of national 
judges and suggests that they create horizontal networks by engaging in 
dialogue with their counterparts in different states, citing and debating their 
judicial decisions, and participating in designated bodies and organizations 
(such as the International Commission of Jurists and the International 
Judicial Academy).59  Vertical networks are created when governments 
delegate simultaneous judicial power on specific issues to international 
courts, and national courts communicate with the latter on the same 
matters.60  Ultimately national courts perceive themselves to be autonomous 
actors.  Rather than automatically identifying themselves with their states, 
they are committed to a wider, transnational society.  
                                                      
55 See Whytock, supra note 112, at 96-114.  Whytock does not ignore the political “shadow of law” 
effect that national court decisions can have on both the national and international spheres.  Nevertheless, 
he does not specifically analyze political IR implications of domestic court decisions.  Id. 
56 For an initial explanation of the concept, see SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 12-15. 
57 Slaughter, supra note 13, at 62. 
58 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 5-6, 12-15. 
59 Id. at 67-69; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1112-1123 
(2000). 
60 SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 82-85; Slaughter, supra note 59, at 1105-1108; Abbott, supra note 
5, at 417–418.  Slaughter specifically studies the ECJ and focuses on the European experience, in which 
judges talk “above and below” national governments when implementing EU law.   
JANUARY 2015 CHANGING THE RULES OF THE (INTERNATIONAL) GAME          113  
 
Although Slaughter does not neglect the international-political aspect 
of national courts’ functions,61 our models only partially overlap.  Slaughter 
concentrates more on the relationships between courts and their counterparts 
(or governments and legislatures and their counterparts) around the world 
and less on the “diagonal” interaction between courts and foreign 
governments.  Concentrating on the latter is yet another step toward 
construing national courts as IPAs. 
To conclude, both Scelle’s and Whytock’s models apply to 
involuntarily influencing or to active/proactive courts.  Slaughter’s model is 
more suited for the actively and proactively-motivated, internationally-
minded courts and judges.  Each has their analytical strengths and 
weaknesses.  This article’s concept of IPAs is designed to capture the whole 
spectrum of national courts’ performance in the international arena, which 
runs on a scale from “weak” IPAs (passively/involuntarily motivated) to 
“strong” IPAs (actively/proactively motivated), as explained before.  
IV. DIRECT INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Taking a position on specific matters with IR-implications is part of 
what transforms national courts and judges into IPAs.  This is true whether 
they do so willingly or unwillingly (depending on their degree of 
internationalist inclination), or voluntarily or involuntarily (depending on 
whether international law is embedded in the case).  Some types of cases, 
like extradition, affect IR and are unavoidable.  They effectively force courts 
into the role of IPAs regardless of their will.  Conversely, many of the IR-
influencing cases can be avoided with familiar “avoidance doctrines” such 
as justiciability, standing, and act of state, which courts have previously 
applied.62  Deciding the merits of the latter cases reflects an independent 
judicial choice to adopt a position bearing an IR impact.  This section 
demonstrates how national courts and judges have directly affected states’ 
IR through judicial decisions on immunities of states and officials, 
extradition, consular notification, and universal jurisdiction. 
                                                      
61 According to Slaughter, “[t]he spread of liberal democracy holds the promise of a widening 
community of liberal states, emboldens courts to act as autonomous foreign policy actors, and enhances 
awareness of a common effort to construct and preserve the rule of law.”  Slaughter, supra note 13, at 62 
(emphasis added).  However, the impact of domestic courts on states’ foreign policies and their relations 
with their own political branches and foreign states remains underdeveloped in her writing.   
62 Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgiving Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis 
of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 159, 169–173 (1993). 
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A. Adjudicating Lawsuits Against Foreign and Quasi-States—the 
Question of Sovereign Immunity 
 
Statehood and self-determination of peoples are undoubtedly matters 
of a highly political nature attached to states’ international relations.  As 
such, it would be expected that answering the question of whether an entity 
is a state would remain in the hands of governments, not courts.  
Consequently, a court’s decision on the statehood of an entity might 
interfere with its (or another) state’s standing in the international arena and 
with its foreign relations.  Thus, for example, the decision to take a position 
on the question of the Palestinian Authority’s (“PA”) statehood, in a world 
constantly preoccupied with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 
Palestinian’s right to self-determination, has a clear international-political 
character.  This character was recently demonstrated in the UN General 
Assembly decision to accord “to Palestine non-member observer state 
status,”63 which may allow Palestine to initiate ICC proceedings against 
Israeli officials for alleged war crimes in the Occupied Territories.64   
Such considerations have not prevented some American and Israeli 
judges from delving into the statehood question and its sovereign immunity 
derivative.  In Ungar v. The Palestinian Authority65 and Nuritz v. The 
Palestinian Authority,66 victims of terrorist attacks and their families sued 
the Palestinian Authority in US and Israeli courts, respectively.67  The judges 
who addressed this question analyzed it under the Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States, which defines a state as a person in 
                                                      
63 G.A. Res. 67/19, no. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/19 (Nov. 29, 2012). 
64 For a comprehensive analysis of the consequences of recognition of the PA as a state, see Gilad 
Noam, The Palestinian Petition to the United Nations for Recognition of a Palestinian State: A 
Legal/Political Analysis, THE JERUSALEM INST. FOR ISRAEL STUD. (2012), 
http://www.jiis.org/.upload/palestinian% 20state-eng.pdf.  A complete version of the document (in Hebrew) 
is available at http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/palestinian%20state.pdf. See also Amichai Cohen, An 
Observer State Status to the Palestinian Authority, THE ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INST. (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/un-recognition-of-a-palestinian-state-a-legal-analysis-updated/. 
65 Estates of Ungar and Ungar ex rel Strachman v. Palestinian Authority, 325 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.R.I. 
2004), aff’d, 402 F.3d 274 (lst Cir. 2005). 
66 CC (Jer) 2538/00 Nuritz v. The Palestinian Authority and Yasser Arafat, Tak-Mech 2003(1) 4968 
[2003] (Isr.). 
67 For additional discussion and American examples, see XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 493 n.239 (2012).  In Israel, see CReq (Jer) 1008/06 Elon Mo're Seminar Association 
v. The State of Israel, Tel-Mech 2006(2) 1718 [2006] (Isr.) (concerning lack of enforcement of Israeli court 
judgments by the PA).  
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international law. 68   In Ungar, the U.S. District Court held that the 
Palestinian Authority was not a state under international law and awarded 
damages to the Ungar family.69  In its Israeli companion case, Nuritz, two of 
the three sitting judges opined that the question was political in nature, and 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should answer this in the form of an 
executive certification announcing the formal position of Israel regarding the 
statehood (or lack thereof) of the Palestinian Authority.70  The third judge, 
however, delved into a substantial examination regarding the fulfillment of 
the Montevideo Convention’s conditions by the Palestinian Authority.71  The 
judge concluded that the Palestinian Authority has not yet reached the status 
of a state under international law, and is therefore not entitled to sovereign 
immunity. 72   The Israeli legislature responded to this adjudication by 
enacting the Foreign States Immunity Law 2008, which authorizes the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to notify the court on the “application of 
immunity to a political entity which is not a foreign state.”73 
Adjudicating claims against established states on noncommercial 
matters (or those that do not fall under established exceptions to sovereign 
immunity)74 can also have implications for international relations.  An 
illuminating example is the Italian-German experience, where Italian courts 
attempted to establish an innovative and controversial exception to the 
principle of sovereign immunity in compensation suits against Germany for 
atrocities committed by the Nazi regime.  In the Ferrini case,75 the Italian 
                                                      
68  Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 
(“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent 
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other 
states.”). 
69  Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 21. 
70  See CC (Jer) 2538/00 Nuritz v. The Palestinian Authority and Yasser Arafat, Tak-Mech 2003(1) 
4968, ¶ 11, 14, 16-18 [2003] (Isr.) (majority opinion). 
71  See id. at ¶ 64-65 (opinion of Drori J.). 
72  See id.  For a discussion on this decision, see Guy Harpaz, The Palestinian Authority and 
Sovereign Immunity in Israeli Courts, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 198 (2007).  The end result of the judgment was that 
the PA was denied immunity (whether on grounds that it was not a state, or that it did not present an 
executive certificate from the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs that affirmed its statehood).  The opinion 
of the majority was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Israel in a later case: CA 4060/03 The Palestinian 
Authority v. Eliyahu Dayan, Tak-El 2007(3), 1194 [2007] (Isr.).   
73  The Foreign States Immunity Law, 5769-2008, SH No. 2189 p. 76, art. 20 (Isr.), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Source/state_immunities/Israel%20Immunities%20January%202009.pdf. 
74 In principle, sovereign immunity covers acts that are iure imperii.  The main exception is private-
commercial acts, but other exceptions, such as torts and labor, have emerged over the years and recently 
found their expression in the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property. 
75 Cass., sez. un. 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro It. 2004, I (It.).  See also Andrea Bianchi, Ferrini v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italian Court of Cassation, March 11, 2004, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 242 (2005). 
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Court of Cassation determined that fundamental human rights (jus cogens) 
prevailed over the principle of state immunity (in that case, the immunity of 
Germany).  This groundbreaking decision was followed by other similar 
judgments in Italian courts that led Germany to initiate proceedings against 
Italy before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).76  In its application to 
the ICJ, Germany stated that “[r]epeated representations with the Italian 
Government ha[d] been of no avail.”77  The Italian government, for its part, 
was far from happy with the decisions of its courts, which created 
unnecessary diplomatic tension with Germany.78  However, due to public 
pressure, Italy made a counter-claim to the ICJ, asserting that Germany 
violated its obligation of reparation owed to Italian victims of the Third 
Reich.79  ICJ denied the counter-claim,80 accepted Germany’s application, 
and rejected the Italian courts’ attempt to establish an international human 
rights law (“IHRL”) exception to state immunity.81 
B. Extradition 
Extradition cases, where states are obliged to assist each other in 
national criminal proceedings, create a platform for judicial influence on 
international relations between states.  In this respect, two opposite scenarios 
may arise.  The first scenario is a situation in which the state’s adherence to 
its international obligations is not assured either for political reasons or 
because national law disrupts their fulfillment, and courts are bound to 
decide for or against compliance with international law.  The second 
scenario is when a state wishes to comply with a treaty obligation to 
extradite, but courts prevent the extradition on grounds of conflicting 
international obligations (specifically IHRL). 
In the first scenario, judges’ pro-IR position usually goes hand in hand 
with a pro-IL stance.  When the Israeli Supreme Court, for instance, decided 
                                                      
76 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.; Greece intervening), 2012 I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 3). 
77 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.; Greece intervening), Application Instituting 
Proceedings, 2008 I.C.J. 143 (Dec. 23), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/14923.pdf. 
78 Interview with Dr. Maria Varaki, legal scholar, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Mar. 20, 2012). 
Dr. Varaki is an expert in international criminal law and institutions, and is personally familiar with the 
case and with the Greek and Italian professionals who were involved in the case. 
79 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.; Greece intervening), Counter-Memorial of Italy 
2009 I.C.J. 128 (Dec. 22), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16017.pdf. 
80 Counter-Claim, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.; Greece intervening), 2010 I.C.J. 
Reports 310, 321 (July 6). 
81 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. 99, at 139.   
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some sensitive extradition cases in which Israel stood to breach international 
obligations, justices who also took a pro-IR position expressed a higher IL-
commitment while making some highly controversial declarations.82  Still, 
since the cases were inherently IR-related, all of the judges, including those 
who did not expressly take a pro-IL or pro-IR position (or the contrary), 
performed as IPAs.  The following two cases are illustrative.  
The Aloni decision (also known as the Nakash case)83 was one of the 
earliest cases in which the Israeli Supreme Court practically neutralized the 
doctrines of standing and justiciability while invalidating the Minister of 
Justice’s decision not to extradite William Nakash to France after he was 
declared fit for extradition by the Court.  Nakash argued that if extradited, 
his life would be in jeopardy from Arab prisoners in the French prison 
because he was a Jew convicted of murdering an Arab man.  Stressing the 
important implications of the case for the relationship between Israel and 
France, the Court’s majority revoked the Minister of Justice’s decision not to 
abide by Israel’s treaty obligation to extradite.84  The court asserted that this 
fear was not based on well-proven and solid grounds, and as such, should be 
outweighed by IR interests.85  
Another example is the Sheinbein case, 86 in which President Barak87 
made an “interpretive effort” to declare Sheinbein, an American juvenile 
with only formal Israeli nationality, fit for extradition to the United States.  
This was despite the explicit wording of the Israeli Extradition Law, 
granting him immunity from extradition as an Israeli national.88  President 
Barak analyzed the rationales for the nationality exception common in 
international extradition law and concluded that formal nationality, in the 
absence of substantial links to the country of nationality, should not prevent 
extradition, despite the wording of the national extradition law.89  Barak’s 
opinion was rejected by the majority of the court, which preferred the 
language of the Israeli Extradition Law.  The majority was aware of the 
problematic consequences to Israel-US relations of a decision not to 
                                                      
82  See, e.g., CrimA 6182/98 Sheinbein v. Attorney General 63(1) PD 625 [1999] (Isr.); HCJ 852/86 
Aloni et al v. Minister of Justice 41(2) PD 1 [1987] (Isr.).  
83  HCJ 852/86 Aloni et al v. Minister of Justice 41(2) PD 1 [1987] (Isr.).  
84  Id. at ¶ 6(d), 13-17. 
85  See id. at ¶ 13-17, 20, 29. 
86  Sheinbein 63(1) PD 625. 
87  Then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Kedmi J., concurring. 
88  See Law To Amend Extraterritorial Offences Laws, 5738-1978, 881 L.S.I. 53, art. 2 (1978) (Isr.). 
89  Sheinbein 63(1) PD 625, ¶ 12-24 (Barak, P., separate). 
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extradite—consequences that were unavoidably attached to the case.90  In 
this respect, the majority judges performed “passively” as IPAs despite their 
clear reluctance to impact Israel-US relations.91  
The second scenario of judicial influence on states’ international 
relations in this context is when courts prevent states’ compliance with a 
treaty obligation to extradite on grounds of conflicting international 
obligations, specifically IHRL.92  This practice also transforms national 
courts into IPAs, establishing them not as bridges, but as barriers between 
contracting states.  In such cases, the interference of national courts with the 
international relations of their states leans on external support and 
legitimization by other states and international actors, which act so as to 
advance the international rules protected by the court.93  
An example of the second scenario is the Czech Constitutional 
Court’s “Decision on Extradition in the Case of a Collision of Obligations 
                                                      
90   Id. at ¶ 20 (majority opinion).  The Washington Post reported direct IR consequences, stating: 
“Congress had threatened to hold up aid to Israel to force Sheinbein’s extradition.”  Laura Blumenfeld and 
Katherine Shaver, Sheinbein Can't Be Extradited, WASH. POST (Feb. 26,1999), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-srv/local/daily/feb99/sheinbein26.htm. 
91  Id.  The Israeli Extradition Law was consequently amended to make sure that only those who are 
both Israeli nationals and residents at the time the crime was committed would benefit.  It also determined 
that they will not enjoy complete immunity from extradition, but only the privilege of serving out their 
punishments in Israeli prisons, close to their families and friends.  See Extradition Law, 5714-1954, 8 L.S.I. 
144, art. 1A (1953–1954). 
92  See, e.g., Nález Ústavního soudu zed ne 15.04.2003 (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Apr. 15, 2003], sp.zn. I. ÚS 752/02 (Czech), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/403a1884f.html 
(discussed below). See also, HR 15 september 2006, NJ 2007, 277 m.nt. AH Klip (Minister of Justice/N Ke
sbir) (Neth.), available at http://www.oxfordlawreports.com/subscriber_article?id=/oril/Cases/law-ildc-
851nl06.  In this case the Dutch Supreme Court encountered the dilemma of deciding between conflicting 
extradition obligations and IHRL: Turkey requested the extradition of the petitioner, a former member of 
the PKK suspected of criminal activity, who protested the request, fearing torture by Turkish authorities.  
The Court established the supremacy of human rights under Article 3 of the ECHR over the Netherlands’ 
extradition obligations to Turkey under the European Convention on Extradition 1957 (ECE).  It decided 
that the legitimate expectation doctrine in extradition law (rule of non-inquiry), which was part of the ECE, 
and invoked by Turkey, does not preclude judicial review over potential violations of other treaty 
obligations that apply to the litigating states, such as the obligations of the ECHR (¶ 3.3. & 3.4.4. to the 
ILDC version).  Therefore, the Court subjected the Netherlands’ extradition obligation under the ECE to 
Turkish authorities’ concrete guarantees of protecting the petitioner from torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, or punishment (¶ 3.4.2.). 
93 In EC countries, courts may lean extensively on ECHR jurisprudence, prohibiting extradition, 
rendition, deportation, and other forms of expulsion of a person by a country in the event that such an act 
would risk that person’s fundamental rights for life, liberty, and physical dignity.  See, e.g., Soering v. 
United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989); Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) (1991); Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991); Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 314 (1997); Ahmed v. Austria, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 278 (1997). 
JANUARY 2015 CHANGING THE RULES OF THE (INTERNATIONAL) GAME          119  
 
Arising from International Treaties.”94  In this case, the Czech Constitutional 
Court examined a constitutional complaint against the decisions of the 
Czech general courts and Minister of Justice to permit the extradition of the 
complainant, a Moldovan citizen, to Moldova for alleged large-scale 
property crimes.95   These decisions originated from the Czech law of 
extradition and the European Convention on Extradition, to which both 
Moldova and the Czech Republic are parties.  The complainant argued that 
extradition would violate his rights under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and Article 3 of the Convention 
against Torture (“CAT”), as he would be exposed to the risk of torture, or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Moldova. 96   After 
establishing it had the power to review the constitutionality of the minister’s 
and the general courts’ decisions under the ECHR and CAT, 97  the 
Constitutional Court went on to assess the factual basis for the complaint.  
The Court requested certain entities that monitor the condition of human 
rights, specifically the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 
Prague and the Czech Helsinki Committee, provided it with information on 
and an evaluation of the human rights record in Moldovan prisons. 98  
Preferring this information over data relied on by the Minister of Justice (in 
particular, a report from the U.S. State Department that affirmed that the 
Moldovan government “generally respects human rights,” the Court 
concluded that there were substantial grounds to believe that there was a 
danger of violation of the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment in the event of extradition.99  
From the text of the decision, it is evident that the Court was fully 
aware of the gravity of the consequences of its decision, both in terms of 
                                                      
94  Decision of the Constitutional Court of Apr. 15, 2003, I ÚS 752/02, supra note 92. 
95  Id.  
96  Id.  
97  Jan Kratochvíl, analyzing another decision that cites this adjudication, explains that “[t]he present 
holding constituted one of several examples of the Czech Constitutional Court favouring a ‘human rights-
friendly’ reading of the Constitution.  Most controversially this was exemplified by its refusal to adhere to 
the 2001 amendment of the Constitution to the extent that it cancelled its power to strike down laws if they 
contravened any international human rights obligations of the Czech Republic.”  See Jan Kratochvíl, 
Analysis of Recognition of a Sentence Imposed by a Thai Court, Constitutional Complaint (Novotný (Emil) 
v Ministry of Justice, Constitutional Complaint, (I. ÚS 601/04; ILDC 990 (CZ 2007)), available at 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ildc/990cz07.case.1/law-ildc-990cz07. See also The Notion of the 
Constitutional Order, Decision on an Application to Annul an Act, Pl. ÚS 36/01, 25 June 2002.  In that 
case, it interpreted the Constitution in a way which retained such a power.  
98  Decision of the Constitutional Court of Apr. 15, 2003, I. ÚS 752/02 (Czech). 
99  Id. 
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invalidating a ministerial decision, precluding compliance with a treaty 
obligation to extradite, and upholding serious accusations against a 
neighboring state.100  These consequences have a clear political character 
and direct IR implications.  As such, they are also open to criticism.  Such a 
critique was made by Roger O’Keefe with regards to a similar practice of 
inquiry by a UK judge into the risk of torture in Russia.  Criticizing the 
court, O’Keefe argues: 
 
As for the court’s inquiry into whether the defendant would be 
subject to torture in the requesting state, which amounted to an 
inquiry into whether a foreign state was likely to act in violation 
of international law, there can be no objection that this 
contravenes the traditional constitutional wisdom, rooted in the 
separation of powers (and on which the practice of executive 
certification is based), that the courts should defer to the 
executive in matters of foreign affairs.101 
 
Note that this case cannot be classified as pro-IL or counter-IL, since 
the court actually decided between competing IL norms, preferring IHRL 
over extradition obligations.  However, the court’s practice surely reflects a 
greater commitment to a wider “audience” of “IHRL promoters” that cuts 
across national borders, again performing as an IPA.102 
                                                      
100  The Czech Republic, an EU member state, is tied to Moldova under the European Neighborhood 
Policy, through which “[t]he EU is developing an increasingly close relationship with Moldova, going 
beyond co-operation, to gradual economic integration and a deepening of political co-operation.” Moldova, 
EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/moldova/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 
2014). 
101  Roger O’Keefe, Analysis of Government of the Russian Federation v Akhmed Zakaev, First 
instance, ILDC 259 (UK 2003) unreported (Bow Street Magistrates’ Court), Nov. 13, 2003 (emphasis 
added), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ildc/259uk03.case.1/law-ildc259uk03?rskey 
=pGo9xw&result=1&prd=ORIL.  On the separation between the factual premises, which should be 
established by the executive, and their legal interpretation, which is to be left for the court, see INSTITUT DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, THE ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL JUDGES AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF 
THEIR STATES art. 7 (1993), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1993_mil_01_en.PDF. 
102 This notion resembles Judge Bork’s concept of the “New Class,” which is comprised of groups of 
like-minded liberal, socialist, and leftist people across the globe.  See ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: 
THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 135 (2003).  It also brings to mind Slaughter’s theory of “transnational 
networks.”  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 13, at 12-15. 
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C. Consular Notification 
According to Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, state 
authorities who detain or arrest a foreign national must inform that person 
"without delay” of her right to have her consulate notified of her arrest.103  
Failure to comply with this obligation opens the door for judicial 
involvement of both international and national courts in a situation with 
significant IR implications.  Cases involving the United States provide 
instructive examples.    
In Avena (Mexico v. United States),104 the ICJ established that U.S. 
authorities violated Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations105 by not informing Mexican nationals of their right to consular 
notification when they were investigated for suspected crimes.  The ICJ 
instructed the United States to “provide, by means of its own choosing, 
review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence.”106  However, in 
Medellin v. Texas,107 the U.S. Supreme Court established that although the 
ICJ’s decision created a valid international obligation, it had no binding 
power within American law without incorporating legislation.108  Therefore, 
the Court denied a petition to review the case of Medellin, a Mexican 
national whose interest was represented by Mexico in Avena.  Medellin was 
eventually executed.109  
Subsequently, in Garcia v. Texas,110 Humberto Leal Garcia (“Leal”) 
invoked the ICJ’s decision in his petition to review his case in a way similar 
to Medellin.  Garcia distinguished his motion from that in Medellin by 
pointing to a bill introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, which purported to 
implement Avena,111 and asked the Court to stay his execution until after the 
bill was discussed in Congress. 112   The majority opinion rejected the 
                                                      
103  Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261. 
104  Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12. 
105  See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 103. 
106  Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 153.9. 
107  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
108  Id. at 498-499. 
109  See Margaret E. McGuinness, International Decisions: Medellin v. Texas, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 622 
(2008).   
110  Garcia v. Texas, 564 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011) (per curiam). 
111 Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S.B. 1194, 112th Cong. (2011). 
112  Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2866. 
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petition, stressing that it makes decisions on the basis of existing, not 
hypothetical, legislation.113  
 The Garcia minority appeared to give significant weight to the IR-
implications of the Court’s decision.114  Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion 
(joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan) held that 
granting a stay of execution would be appropriate since in this case, the 
Obama Administration had requested the Court to allow some time for 
Leahy’s bill to be considered in Congress, and denying this request may 
“cause irreparable harm” to “foreign-policy interests of the highest order.”115  
Justice Breyer continued by presenting the Government’s position, agreeing 
that failing to halt Leal’s execution would place the United States in 
irremediable breach of its international-law obligation, with “serious 
repercussions for United States foreign relations, law-enforcement and 
other cooperation with Mexico, and the ability of American citizens 
traveling abroad to obtain the benefits of consular assistance in the event of 
detention.”116  Mexico stated that declining to delay Leal’s execution “would 
seriously jeopardize the ability of the Government of Mexico to continue 
working collaboratively with the United States on a number of joint 
ventures, including extraditions, mutual judicial assistance, and efforts to 
strengthen . . . common border.”117  
Despite these clearly pronounced official statements, the majority of 
judges decided to decline Garcia’s request to review his case in light of 
impending legislation that implements Avena,118 and in doing so, behaved as 
(disruptive) IPAs.  Again, due to the nature of the case, all of the judges 
were potential IPAs, influencing (by contributing to or disturbing) their 
state’s IR.  Recalling a comment made earlier, it is interesting to note that 
the minority’s pro-IR position was also pro-IL (and the majority’s 
indifferent position toward IR was also indifferent to IL). 
                                                      
113  Id. at 2868. 
114  Id. at 2869-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
115  Id. at 2870 (quoting the Solicitor General). 
116 Id. (emphasis added). 
117 Id. at 2870 (citing Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23) 
(emphasis added).   
118  Id. at 2868. 
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D. Universal Jurisdiction 
Universal Jurisdiction is a legal doctrine that allows states to try 
defendants with no traditional jurisdictional links (e.g., personal, territorial) 
due to the severity of the crimes and their character as erga omnes.  The 
application of the universal jurisdiction doctrine against foreign officials 
gave rise to some heavy IR concerns in different countries.  Such concerns 
were expressed, for instance, by the Republic of the Congo in its application 
to the ICJ against France:  
 
The proceedings in question are perturbing the international 
relations of the Republic of the Congo as a result of the 
publicity accorded, in flagrant breach of French law governing 
the secrecy of criminal investigations, to the actions of the 
investigating judge, which impugn the honour and reputation of 
the Head of State, of the Minister of the Interior and of the 
Inspector-General of the Armed Forces and, in consequence, 
the international standing of the Congo.  Furthermore, those 
proceedings are damaging to the traditional links of Franco-
Congolese friendship.  If these injurious proceedings were to 
continue, that damage would become irreparable.119  
 
Indeed, the implementation of the universal jurisdiction doctrine by 
national judges has been the source of some high-profile diplomatic 
incidents between states over the past decade.120  This was true specifically 
in cases that made claims against senior foreign officials and military 
officers.121  
Máximo Langer examined five case-studies of “universal jurisdiction 
states”—Germany, England, France, Belgium, and Spain—all having 
different arrangements for distribution of authority and control over 
universal jurisdiction proceedings between the judicial system and the 
political/executive branches.  His survey illustrates the ways in which courts 
and judges’ behave in states where they had the authority to autonomously 
                                                      
119  Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), Request for the 
Indication of a Provisional Measure, 2003 I.C.J. 129 ¶ 26 (June 17) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/129/8204.pdf. 
120  Langer, supra note 22. 
115 A comprehensive description of the most famous incidents (and others) is found in Langer’s study. 
See id. at 10-41. 
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engage in universal jurisdiction proceedings and generated “IR costs” for 
their governments. 122   According to Langer, the IR costs of universal 
jurisdiction cases will generally be determined by the existence (or lack 
thereof) of a broad international agreement that the defendant should stand 
trial; the position of the defendant’s nation state in protesting his prosecution 
or not; the strength of international leverage of the defendant’s nation 
state,123 and, so it seems, by the rank (or supremacy) of the defendant in his 
country.  Langer’s empirical findings are conclusive.  The only cases that 
eventually made trial were against Rwandans, former Yugoslavs, Nazis, 
Afghans, one Congolese and one Argentinean; the rest of the prompted or 
self-initiated prosecutions (over 1,050 complaints, including against British, 
Canadian, Chinese, French, Israeli, Russian and American nationals) had 
excessive IR costs.124 
Langer maps the incentives and disincentives of the political and 
executive branches to implement the power of universal jurisdiction.  He 
demonstrates the part played by courts and judges, who may naturally 
sympathize with the goals of some political actors, and can contribute to 
achieving these goals.125  For the most part, he portrays the political and 
judicial branches as opposing authorities with regards to IR matters.  
Political authorities have more IR concerns in contrast to courts and judges 
who choose to promote universal jurisdiction.  He notes that “[a]s we move 
along the spectrum of greater to lesser executive branch control over 
criminal proceedings, the spectrum of expected costs to the prosecuting state 
of defendants against whom formal proceedings are opened moves in the 
opposite direction.”126  That is to say, the more the judicial system controls 
universal jurisdiction application, the more influential it becomes on its 
state’s international relations.  
In some respects, universal jurisdiction proceedings have become a 
mechanism in the rapidly developing “lawfare,” which transforms 
courthouses into “battlefields” in international and non-international armed 
                                                      
122  Langer includes in what is referred to in this article as "IR costs," economic costs that may be 
induced form diplomatic tension between states.  See id. at 6-7. 
123  Concluded from Langer's analysis.  See id. at 6-7, 9-10.  Some obvious examples of high-leverage 
states are the US, the UK, China, and Russia.  The vast majority of the African states possess low 
international leverage.  
124  See id. at 8-9.    
125  See id.  
126  Id. at 2.  
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conflicts.127  The Israeli experience is illustrative.  In December 2009, Tzipi 
Livni, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, was forced to cancel an official 
visit to the UK after she learned that a UK judge issued an arrest warrant 
against her by following a private petition.128  The basis for this warrant was 
alleged war crimes committed during Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 
through January 2009) in Gaza by Israel when Livni was the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and a member of the Israeli Government war cabinet.129  The 
warrant was issued based upon the universal jurisdiction doctrine.  This 
caused deep embarrassment to the UK Foreign Office, which stated:  
 
The UK is determined to do all it can to promote peace in the 
Middle East and to be a strategic partner of Israel.  To do this, 
Israel’s leaders need to be able to come to the UK for talks with 
the British government.  We are looking urgently at the 
implications of this case.130  
 
This event followed an earlier case occurring in the UK: Israeli Major 
General Doron Almog was accused of committing alleged war crimes.131  
This warrant, too, was initiated privately and was founded on the universal 
jurisdiction doctrine.  The British Foreign Minister formally apologized for 
the “embarrassing incident.”132  
Approximately one year before the Livni incident, an investigating 
judge in Spain opened criminal proceedings against several Israeli 
politicians and military officers based on the universal jurisdiction 
principle.133  These officials were involved in the targeted killing of Hamas 
leader Salah Shehadeh, which caused the death of 15 civilians, including 
eight children—an action allegedly amounting to a war crime.134  These 
                                                      
127  On “lawfare,” see Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, 
Gaza and Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 279 (2010). 
128  See Langer, supra note 22, at 17; see also Ian Black & Ian Cobain, British Court Issued Gaza 
Arrest Warrant for Former Israeli Minister Tzipi Livni, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/14/tzipi-livni-israel-gaza-arrest. 
129  See Langer, supra note 22, at 17; see also Black & Cobain, supra note 128.  
130  Black & Cobain, supra note 128. 
131  See Langer, supra note 22, at 17. 
132  See Editorial, Straw Apology for Israeli Arrest, BBC NEWS (Sep. 22, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4270664.stm; see also Dominic Casciani, Police Feared 
'Airport Stand-Off', BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7251954.stm. 
133  See Langer, supra note 22, at 38. 
134  Id. 
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proceedings, alongside other criminal proceedings initiated by Spanish 
judges against other foreign leaders (e.g., the US and China) “embarrassed 
the Spanish government, which wants to play an active diplomatic role in 
efforts to bring peace to the Middle East.”135  
The national political branches in both the UK and Spain reacted 
similarly: government members expressed concerns for their states’ 
international relations with the state of Israel.136  In addition, national laws 
and policies were amended so as to prevent a similar future incident137 (a 
backlash development this author further discusses in a different paper).138   
                                                      
135  See Spanish Prosecutor Seeks to Shelve Israel Case, EXPATICA.COM, (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://www.expatica.co.uk/news/british-news/Spanish-prosecutors-seek-to-shelve-Israel-case_51244.html? 
ppager=0. 
136  While in the UK case these concerns were publicly expressed, in Spain these concerns were at the 
“backstage” of the diplomatic scene.  See, e.g., Editorial, Straw Apology for Israeli Arrest, supra 132; Ian 
Black, Gordon Brown Reassures Israel Over Tzipi Livni Arrest Warrant, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 
2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/16/tzipi-livni-israel-arrest-warrant.  In Spain, the 
School of Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation published the 2013 Notebook 
Number 49 (Memories of Master Students in Diplomacy and International Relations, 2011-2012) titled 
“Current Issues of Diplomacy and International Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century.”  The 
publication was dedicated to the study of “Universal Jurisdiction and the impact of its application in foreign 
policy,” acknowledging the diplomatic tensions between Spain and other states—such as Israel, the United 
States, and China—caused by judges’ application of the universal jurisdiction principle against these states’ 
officials. See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. AND COOPERATION,  Current Issues of Diplomacy and 
International Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century, 49 J. OF THE DIPLOMATIC SCH. (2013), http://w
ww.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/Ministerio/EscuelaDiplomatica/Documents/cuadernos%2049.pdf. 
137  At a conference at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Baroness Scotland, the UK Attorney 
General, stated, “The government is looking urgently at ways in which the UK system might be changed to 
avoid this situation arising again.  Israel's leaders should always be able to travel freely to the UK.”  See 
MATTHEW TAYLOR, Ministers Plan Law Change to Stop Arrests of Foreign Officials, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 
15, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/15/foreign-officials-arrest-law-changes. In a story by 
David Bosco, the author reports that the Spanish parliament overwhelmingly passed a measure that would 
require judges to take only cases that had some demonstrable link to Spain.  If the measure is implemented, 
Spain will follow the path of Belgium, which scaled back its own universal jurisdiction law in 2003 after a 
Belgian judge opened an investigation of U.S. General Tommy Franks for the use of cluster bombs in Iraq.  
An American threat to move NATO headquarters out of Brussels persuaded Belgium to alter its law.  See 
David Bosco, The Inquisition, Part II?, WASH. POST (May 24, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpd
yn/content/article/2009/05/22/AR2009052201749.html.  For more on the amendment of the Belgian law, 
see Michele Hirsch & Nathalie Kumps, The Belgian Law of Universal Jurisdiction Put to the Test, 35 
JUSTICE/THE INT’L ASS’N OF JEWISH LAW. & JURISTS 20 (2003).  For more on the Spanish case, see 
Thomas Catan, Spain is Moving to Rein In Its Crusading Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124276949318736375.html.  See also Langer’s instructive summary of the 
dynamics of political and legislative reaction to the IR-implications of the universal jurisdiction application 
by their courts.  Langer refers specifically to the British and Spanish cases, where the law has indeed gone 
through significant reform to limit judges’ power to initiate/cooperate with private initiatives for universal 
jurisdiction proceedings.  See Langer, supra note 22, at 15-19, 32-41.  
138  Osnat Grady Schwartz, International Law and National Courts: Between Mutual empowerment 
and Mutual Weakening, 23 CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. (Spring 2015, forthcoming).  
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Israeli (and other foreign) officials have faced similar proceedings in 
Belgium, too, although in a quite distinctive manner.  Both in the UK and 
Spain, judges demonstrated willingness, and sometimes eagerness, to initiate 
and cooperate with private criminal proceedings against foreign officials, 
occasionally in opposition to their government’s sentiment.139  Conversely, 
the Belgian prosecution and courts were at first rather hesitant to give full 
effect to similar private initiatives and tried to introduce restrictions—such 
as requiring the physical presence of the accused in Belgium.140  It was 
actually the political branches (government and parliament alike) that 
encouraged such proceedings and later141 amended the Belgium law to that 
effect.142  The Court of Cassation, Second Chamber followed the political 
branches' line (while respecting restrictions set by the ICJ in Congo v. 
Belgium regarding the immunity of serving senior officials)143 by allowing 
the trial in absentia of foreign former senior officials on the condition that 
their immunity had expired.144  
These events indeed had diplomatic implications and IR costs for 
Israel-Belgium relations, including the temporary withdrawal by Israel of its 
ambassador from Belgium.145  Still, it should be noticed that these costs were 
primarily induced by a conscious policy of the authorities responsible for 
Belgium’s foreign relations:  its political branches.146  The latter deliberately 
                                                      
139  See Editorial, Straw Apology for Israeli Arrest, supra note 132; Casciani, Police Feared 'Airport 
Stand-Off', supra note 132. 
140  Langer, supra note 22, at 29 n.170.  See also Aluf Ben, The Foreign Minister’s Office Attempts to 
Prevent Belgium Legislation that Would Allow Sharon’s Prosecution, HA’ARETZ (July 11, 2002), 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.808807 (Isr.).  
141  Apr. 23, 2003.  See Langer, supra note 22, at 30. 
142  Yossi Melmen, Prime Minister of Belgium Supports a Law that Allows Sharon’s Adjudication, 
HA’ARETZ (Jan. 14, 2003), http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.854352 (Isr.). 
143  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 11). 
144  Langer, supra note 22, at 29 n.171 (citing Cass., Feb. 11, 2003, No. P.02.1139.F, reprinted in 42 
ILM 596 (2003) (Eng. trans.)).  See also Ayel Gross, Doubtful the Belgians Will Exhaust Legal 
Proceedings, YNET (February 13, 2003), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-2432833,00.html (Isr.); 
Haaretz Editorial, Ambassador to Belgium Will be Returned Shortly to Brussels, HA’ARETZ (Apr. 14, 
2003), http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.875668 (Isr.); Diana Bahooor & Efrat Weiss, Netanyahu to the 
Belgian Ambassador: This is Blood Libel, YNET (Feb. 13, 2003), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
2429614,00.html (Isr.).  
145  Langer, supra note 22, at 29.  See also Diana Bahooor, Israel Will Not Boycott Procedures 
Against Sharon in Belgium, YNET (Feb. 19, 2003), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2444934,00.html 
 (Isr.). 
146  Langer, supra note 22, at 30.  IR costs naturally encompass other states whose officials were 
investigated or prosecuted in Belgium, including the United States, which threatened to remove North 
Atlantic Trade Organization (“NATO”) headquarters from Brussels, and Iran, whose parliament demanded 
financial compensation for the "pain inflicted upon the Iranian people" from the complaint against former 
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expanded the scope of the universal jurisdiction laws in Belgium147 and 
allowed and even encouraged private initiatives (with which judges could 
cooperate), by, inter alia, not placing any significant restraints on them.148  
The Belgian courts’ performance as IPAs was, thus, a direct consequence of 
deliberate political choice to use them as a tool for international 
involvement.  Legislation amendments in August 2003 finally “relieved” the 
courts of this “extended role.”149   An amendment to the Belgian law 
practically left the power to begin universal jurisdiction investigations in the 
hands of the federal prosecutor (i.e., a body that is subject to the executive), 
who will carefully pick the cases so as not to impede Belgium’s international 
relations.150 
The IR influence of national courts not only motivated actions in 
those countries whose courts issued the warrants, but also in states whose 
officials were the ones targeted.  Israel, for instance, based on previous 
experience, and aware of future risks, has established a special advocacy unit 
aimed at taking preemptive actions to guarantee acting and former officials 
will not be arrested on foreign soil in universal jurisdiction proceedings.151  
Israel has also founded public and governmental investigation commissions 
to examine the conduct of the authorities (both governmental and military) 
in serious events in which it was accused of violating the laws of war (e.g., 
the Second Lebanon War in 2006 (the Winograd Commission)152 and the 
Gaza Flotilla in 2010 (the Turkel Commission).153  Such investigations 
would prove—or so it was hoped—Israel’s seriousness and respect for IL 
and avert foreign and international judicial involvement based on the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
president Rafsanjani.  Alain Winants, The Yerodia Ruling of the International Court of Justice and the 
1993/1999 Belgian Law on Universal Jurisdiction, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 491, 503 n.65 (2003). 
147  Langer’s survey, see Langer, supra note 22, at 26-28. 
148  In Belgium, the law is lax in “punishing” complainants who wrongfully sued defendants in civil 
cases that were dismissed by court.  At most the law requires compensation for legal expenses.  Langer, 
supra note 22, at 27-28, n.157 (citing C.I.CR. Art. 128; C.JUD. Art. 1022).  In comparison, in France, a 
private party who initiates proceedings that are finally dismissed by a judge may have to be fined (if the 
prosecutor convinced the judge that the initiation was abusive or dilatory), and all the accused persons may 
pursue damages.  Id. at 20, nn.102-04 (citing C. PR. P´EN. Art. 88, 88-1, 91, 177-2, 177-3).  
149  Langer, supra note 22, at 31 n.188 (citing Loi relative aux violations graves du droit international 
humanitaire of Aug. 5, 2003, Art. 27, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.], Aug. 7, 2003, 21, 182 (Belg)). 
150  Langer, supra note 22, at 31-32. 
151  See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE-DEPARTMENT OF SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE 
STATE ATTORNEY, http://www.igf.org.il/listItem.aspx?CID=1315 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
152 See Winograd Commission, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winograd_Commission (last 
visited May 7, 2014). 
153 See Turkel Commission, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkel_Commission (last visited 
May 7, 2014). 
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doctrines of complementarity (relative to the ICC) 154  and subsidiarity 
(relative to foreign national courts).155    
V. INDIRECT INFLUENCE: SUPPORTING THE TRENDS OF LEGALIZATION AND 
JUDICIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BY EMPOWERING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 The legalization of international politics is a precondition for national 
courts and judges to become IPAs.  It allows them a foothold in the 
international arena, creating an opportunity for judges to have an 
international impact through engagement with international law. 
International law also empowers national courts in various ways, creating an 
incentive for them to engage with it. 156   At the same time, judicial 
engagement with international law empowers international law, as is 
discussed below.  It thus generates a circle of mutual empowerment between 
national courts and international law, which further supports the trends of 
international legalization and judicialization.  The three most important 
interrelated ways of empowerment between international law and IPAs are 
recognizing international law as a legitimate and binding legal system, 
enhancing the effectiveness and legitimacy of international courts and 
tribunals, and further developing international law. 157 
A. Recognizing International Law as a Legitimate and Binding Legal 
 System 
Today, international law is largely considered a “legal system.”  
However, indicative of the skeptical views still held by national actors, some 
judges and scholars still feel the need to stress this point.158  Enforcement is 
                                                      
154 This is a “vertical” principle that applies to the relations between states and an international court 
(the ICC).  See supra Part III.A. 
155  This doctrine operated horizontally—between states—and not vertically.  See Langer, Supra note 
22, at 39; Grady Schwartz, supra note 138. 
156  On ways of empowerment of national courts by international law, see Grady Schwartz, supra note 
138, at 6-24.    
157  Several more ways of empowerment are discussed in Grady Schwartz.  See Grady Schwartz, supra 
note 138, at 25-34. 
158  See, e.g., HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe et al v. The Prime Minister of Israel et al 60(2) PD 477 [2005] 
(Isr.) (Cheshin, Vice President) (acknowledging that the international law “became stronger and began to 
stand on its own two feet as a legal system worthy of the title ‘law’”).  For a scholarly discussion of the 
matter see YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, 
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crucial in defeating this skepticism and contributing to the entrenchment of 
international law as a legal system.  Given that non-enforced law remains 
only “a symbol of the moral aspiration of its authors,”159 and due to the 
weakness (and sometimes absence) of enforcement by international judicial 
bodies, references to and enforcement of international law by national courts 
and judges serve to recognize it in practice.  
By applying international law as comparative law or a canon of 
interpretation, national courts further substantiate international law as having 
enforceable power that binds (or at least ought to bind) governments.  This 
clearly occurs when national courts cite and enforce international “hard law” 
such as treaties and international customs.160  International law is also 
reinforced by approvingly referring to its “soft law,” such as the resolutions 
and special committees’ reports of United Nation organs, 161  and its 
subsidiary sources, including the decisions of international judicial bodies.162  
 Quoting international courts’ decisions does two things.  First, it 
legitimizes these decisions 163  which helps to establish authoritative 
                                                                                                                                                                 
93-94 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 2003).  See also Frédéric Mégret, International Law as Law, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (James Crawford & Martii Koskenniemi eds., 2012). 
159 See also Fiona de Londras, Dualism, National Courts, and the Rule of International Law, in THE 
RULE OF LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 217, 218 (M. Sellers & T. Tomaszewski eds., 2010); ANDRE 
NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 265 (Oxford Univ. Press, 
2011). 
160  See Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 38(1)(a), 38(1)(b), June 26 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute). 
161 See, e.g., Cuzco Bar Association and ors v. Congress of the Republic, Original petition, 
Accumulated Claims 050-2004-A1/TC, 051-2004.A1/TC, 004-2005-P1/TC, 007-2005-P1/TC, 009-2005-
P1/TC; ILDC 679 (PE 2005), June 3, 2005 (Peru) (citing General Comment 3, Nature of State Parties’ 
Obligations, U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 5th Sess. (1990), U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 14 (2003)); Constantinou v. Cyprus, Judicial Review Decision, Case No. 302/80; 
ILDC 917 (CY 1984), Mar. 24, 1984 [Sup. Ct.] (Cyprus) (citing Declaration on the Rights of Disabled 
Persons, G.A. Res. 3447/XXX, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 at 88 (Dec. 9, 1975); Minister 
of Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs v. Fourie and Bonthuys, Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project and 18 ors v. Minister of Home Affairs and ors, Application for Leave to Appeal, Appeal, and 
Cross-Appeal, 2005 CCT60/04; CCT10/05; ILDC 282 (Dec. 1, 2005) (S. Afr.) (citing U.N. Human Rights 
Committee in Joslin v. New Zealand to address the question of the legal recognition and protection of 
homosexual marriage); Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing, inter alia, G.A.Res. 
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc A/8028, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970); Declaration 
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3532/XXX, Annex, U.N. 
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/1034, at 91 (Dec. 9, 1975) (in the quest for determination 
whether official torture constituted a violation of customary IL)). 
162  See ICJ Statute, supra note 160, art. 38(1)(d). 
163  See Slaughter, supra note 59, at 1103 (binding enforcement with legitimacy ‘and the 
delegitimization of international legal rules that are not enforced’).  See also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 375 
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international “hard law.”  Second, it increases the effectiveness of cited 
international courts, supporting their role as the judiciary of the international 
legal system.  This brings us to national courts and judges’ contribution to 
the judicialization of international relations. 
B. Enhancing the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of International Courts 
 and Tribunals—Supporting the Judicialization of International 
 Politics. 
National courts contribute to the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
international courts and tribunals when they cite, recognize, and enforce 
their decisions. 164   Examples are found in all liberal democracies, 165 
demonstrating varying degrees of respect for or acceptance of international 
courts’ decisions amongst national courts.  National courts and judges’ 
application of decisions made by international courts significantly increases 
the chance states will comply with the latter’s rulings.166  A good example of 
this is the European experience regarding the ECJ and ECHR.167  According 
to Mattli and Slaughter, “the primary mechanism for the expansion of 
European law has been the . . . cooperation of judges (and lawyers) in the 
member states [with the ECJ], thereby creating a community of actors above 
and below the state.”168  To Alter, such “vertical networking” was essential 
since governments often resented the ECJ’s authority.169  
The importance of cooperation amongst national courts for the 
success of international law and its judiciary in governing transnational 
activity has been recognized by various scholars and organizations.170  In a 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(1997), n.460 (regarding the Eur. Ct. H.R. decision in Soering v United Kingdom, App no 14038/88 
(A/161) Eur. Ct. H.R. 1989).  
164  Whytock, supra note 12, at 108; Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and 
Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 467-69 (2000). 
165 See Oxford Reports on International Law, OXFORD PUB. INT’L LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/
oril (last visited Oct 7, 2014).  The Oxford Reports on International Law’s website includes hundreds of 
cases from many states under the module International Law in Domestic Courts (ILDC). 
166  See Joseph H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 
26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 519 (1994).  According to Weiler, states will have a harder time resisting their 
own courts’ decisions than international bodies’ decisions. 
167  See Keohane et al., supra note 164; Whytock, supra note 12, at 108-09.   
168  Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to 
Garrett, 49(1) INT'L ORG. 183, 184 (1995) (emphasis added.). 
169  KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 219-20 (2001). 
170  See, e.g., Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 
385, 393 (2000) (“[T]he primary site for the enforcement of international law is ultimately domestic . . . .  
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resolution from 1993, the Institut de Droit International acknowledged the 
importance of national courts in properly implementing international law.171  
It deemed the willingness of national courts to cooperate with international 
courts necessary for effective international institutions.172  Some scholars 
believe that in order to achieve this, national courts should set aside “judicial 
restraints” based on political doctrines, which sometimes yield results 
contradictory to international law.173  
These suggestions are not without detractors.  Judicial restraints and 
political doctrines aim to protect separation of powers.  Some argue that 
setting aside such restraints may disturb the balance of power between the 
three branches of government, and further empower the judiciary at the 
expense of the legislature and the executive.174  This debate sharpens the 
mutual-empowerment relationship between national courts and international 
law, and demonstrates how national courts’ contribution to the 
empowerment of international law is intertwined with gaining more political 
power, allowing them to act as IPAs.  
C. Developing International Law 
Judgments made by national courts constitute “subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of [international] law.” 175   National courts 
contribute to the development of both customary rules and treaty law.  
Regarding customary law, national courts can clarify the existence, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
The more important incentives for compliance are ultimately domestic.”).  See, e.g., Whytock, supra note 
12; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 163; John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of 
Sovereignty, Globalization, and Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 374 
(Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).  
171  INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, The Activities of National Judges and the International 
Relations of their State, NINTH COMMISSION, RAPPORTEUR: MR BENEDETTO CONFORTI, SESSION OF MILAN 
(1993), http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1993_mil_01_en.PDF.  See also Eyal Benvenisti, Judges 
and Foreign Affairs: A Comment in the institut de Droit International’s Resolution on ‘The Activities of 
National Courts and the International Relations of their State, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 423 (1994).   
172  See INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 171. 
173  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to 
Constitutionalize the UN Dispute Settlement System?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 753, 785 (1999). 
Conversely, it can be argued that, to the extent that avoidance doctrines express comity towards 
international courts, these doctrines can actually strengthen international courts’ authoritativeness. 
174  This is the main argument against a domestic court’s voluntary application of international law, as 
mentioned before.  For further discussion, see, e.g., Kochan, supra note 21; Sarah K. Harding, Comparative 
Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 409 (2003). 
175  See Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 38(1)(d), June 26 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
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emergence, and scope of an international custom.176  Their decisions can 
also help create international customs, as they present both state practice and 
opinio juris.  They constitute state practice due to the fact that national 
courts are state organs and therefore their decisions are attributed to their 
states. 177   They articulate opinio juris because of their normative and 
deliberative character.178  The formation of a new custom is, of course, 
dependent on compliance from the state with the decisions of its courts179 
and on the compliance of other states with practice and opinio juris, which 
in turn can arise from their own courts. 
As for treaty law, national courts’ application and interpretation of 
international law substantiates “the agreement of the parties regarding [the 
treaty's] interpretation.”180  Engaging in “transjudicial communication,” one 
court’s interpretation of a treaty can influence the interpretation of that treaty 
by foreign courts, which, in turn, substantiates their states’ understanding of 
cited treaties and helps build treaties’ authoritativeness.181  Regardless of the 
“correctness” of their decisions182 or their methods of interpretation,183 as 
long as other states and courts’ respond to them affirmatively, a national 
courts’ application of international treaties forms an additional layer in the 
development of international law. 
National courts have made a special contribution to the development 
of IHRL through at least two types of decisions:  first, utilizing IHRL 
instruments to support domestic-in-essence decisions that deal with 
                                                      
176  See Whytock, supra note 12, at 104-107; NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 8, at 264-279. 
177  See Int’l L. Ass’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
art. ch.IV.E.1, 4 Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10) (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d
db8f804.html. 
165  See also NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 8, at 267-68; Whytock, supra note 12, at 106; BENEDETTO 
CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 79 (1993). 
179 See Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, INT’L L. ASS’N (2000), 
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/30; NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 8, at 270-271 (“In the 
ultimate analysis, since it is the executive which has primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign 
relations, that organ's formal position ought usually to be accorded more weight that conflicting positions 
of the . . . national courts.”).  Germany v. Italy demonstrates how courts’ decisions contradict their 
governments’ expressed positions.  Due to the fact that the executive bears the ‘primary responsibility for 
the conduct of foreign relations,’ the executive’s position should prevail. 
180  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(VCLT). 
181  See Slaughter, supra note 13; NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 8, at 244-279. 
182  See Tzanakopoulos, supra note 24, at 159-160.  To Tzanakopoulos, international law development 
can also evolve from an 'incorrect' or even a 'violating' interpretation of international treaties. 
183  Although courts do not always refer to international law rules of interpretation (Articles 31-32 of 
the VCLT), their interpretation methods, based on their national law, are usually similar.   
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consubstantial norms (i.e., “domestic rules that are in substance reflective of 
an existing international rule”); 184  second, deciding between competing 
international norms, such as IHRL on the one hand, and United Nations 
Security Council resolutions,185 the principle of state immunity,186 and treaty 
obligations regarding extradition187 on the other hand.  These decisions help 
define relationships between rules and norms of international law by 
recognizing some of them as jus cogens, by classifying them as substantial 
or procedural, and by establishing hierarchy between them. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The behavior of national courts as IPAs is a multi-layered 
phenomenon with various implications for relations between states.  It 
contains both legal and political aspects, exogenous constraints and 
voluntary motivations.  The IPA model advanced here—as distinct from 
other models relating to the role of national courts at the international 
level—highlights the international, political impact of national courts and 
judges, and the diagonal interaction between them and foreign political 
branches of government.  As IPAs, national courts and judges affect 
international politics both directly and indirectly, in a focal or dispersed 
fashion, and in either a general or particular manner:  directly—by taking 
position on issues colored with a clear political hue, influencing the behavior 
and policy making of foreign states; indirectly—by supporting the 
development of the trends of legalization and judicialization of IR, which 
shape the “rules of the game” in contemporary global governance and 
international relations.  The inherent political tension introduced by this 
                                                      
184  Tzanakopoulos, supra note 24, at 143. 
185 See, e.g., R (Al Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defense, [2007] Q.B. 621 (Eng.).  The decision 
was overturned by the Eur. Ct. H.R. (Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
789 (2011)), but its subsequent scholarly analysis and discussion contributes to IHRL development.  See, 
e.g., Zgonec-Rožej, Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 106(4) AM. J. INT'L L. 830 (2012); Marko Milanovic, Al-
Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasburg, 23(1) EUR. J. INT'L L. 121 (2012); see also NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 8, 
at 7-8. 
186 Unlike the Greek and Italian courts which attempted to limit Germany's state immunity in cases of 
IHRL peremptory norms, the British court rejected this notion in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 
(U.K.).  The Greek and Italian courts attempts also prompted an international court (ICJ) judgment, which 
determined the hierarchy of IHRL and state immunity norms, thus contributing to the further development 
of international law as a whole.  
187 See, e.g., HR 15 september 2006, NJ 2007, 277 m.nt. AHK (Ministerie van Justitie/N. Kesbir) 
(Neth.) (on the extradition from the Netherland to Turkey of a PKK former member who was accused of 
criminal activity). 
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development in court-governmental relations will probably play a major role 
in determining whether this development will flourish or diminish over time.  
But as things stand, the study of IR-IL should further consider the 
international political impact of national courts and judges and its 
interwoven connection to their engagement with international law.  
 
